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Preface
This document contains the SEPAC S acelab Mission 1 report.
	
p	 p
The	 document was
	 prepared	 for	 the	 Information	 and
Electronics Laboratory of the Marshall Space Flight Center under
NASA Contract NAS8-34747. The report is based on the minutes
maintained by J. R. Bounds and W. M. Womack of Intermetrics and
J. R. Watkins of NASA/MSFC/EB42.'
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NOTE
This report would be remiss without highlighting the
excellent coordination of the SEPAC, POCC. and HOSC teams in
trying  to resolve the RAU 21 problem. The team members worked
very hard and with tremendous cooperation.
	
Particular thanks
goes to the following:
Gene	 Canerossi	 (IBM)
Jim	 Christy	 (MSFC)
Kathy	 Hellman
	
(MSFC)
Milt	 Herron	 (MSFC)
Geroge	 Lide	 (TRW) i
Tom Lynch	 ( MSFC)
Randy McClendon	 (MSFC) 4	 ^^
Mac	 McCrory	 (IBM) i
Bill	 Roberts	 (MSFC)
Sid	 Sexton	 (IBM)
Bob	 Stevens	 (MSFC) Sr
Jimmy Watkins	 (MSFC)
i
{
i
J
5
3
i
''	 1
SEPAL REPORT
r
r
r
1.0 General Overview
2.0 FO Summary
3.0 FO Details
4.0 Major Events
f
F
f
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
L
5.0 Software Lessons Learned
6.0 General Lessons Learned
7.0 Recommendations
M
d
w
1
^ 	 1
1.0 GENERAL OVERVIEW
This document contains a detailed report of the SEPAC
Spacelab Mission 1 activities relevant to software operations.
Included also in this report are Spacelab events and problems
that did not directly affect SEPAC but are of interest to
experimenters.
Spacelab Mission 1 was launched from KSC on 28 November
1983 at 10:10 Huntsville time.
The SEPAC POCC operations support was divided into two
teams (Figure 1-1): the Rose team headed by William Taylor of
TRW and the Cherry Blossom team headed by Roger Williamson of
Stanford University.	 Each tearn worked a twelve hour shift -
Rose shift was 4 : 00 AM until 4:00 PM; Cherry Blossom shift was
4:00 PM until 4:00 AM. Generally, there was a 30 minute overlap
on team handovers.
 b eachA log was maintainedy osition on the POCC teams.p
The contents of this report are mainly taken from the Software
Engineering Manager (SEM) log.
In general, the Spacelab Mission met its objectives. As
described later, 'there were two major problems associated with
SEPAC: the loss of the EBA gun and the infamous RAU 21.
Figure 1-2 depicts the initial assessment of Dr. T.
Obayashi of the SEPAC Spacelab Mission 1.
pronsBa e y Yd eliminary analysis of SEPAC data there are no
problems that are directly attributable to SEPAC Flight
Software.
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Problems that should be analyzed are:
• SEPAC Gap problem,
• DEP READY NO problem, and
• System Stop problem.
These problems
	 are characteristic	 of overall	 system
problems and must be evaluated in coordination with the hardware
people.	 Each of these has occurred in the laboratory but was
never resolved.	 The area of cpncern is the interface bztween
the IU and the NSSC-I1.	 Prior to the reflight of SEPAC, the
IU/DEP interface should be clean.
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FIGURE 1-2: INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF DR. T. OBAYASFII
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The SEPAC FO summary for Spacelab Mission 1 was:
	
2	 OEP READY NO TYPE PROBLEMS
	
2	 SYSTEM STOP
	3 	 SHUTDOWNS FROM INSTRUMENTS
	
12	 RAU 21 PROBLEMS (NOT RUN)
	
21	 FO's
	40	 Total FO's
Figure 2-1 is a tabular summary of the FO's that were run.
Section 3.0 contains details on these FO's.
Figure 2-2 is the initial FO crew timeline.
Figures 2-3 and 2-4 are graphic presentations of the
initial and extended day mission for SEPAC operations.
2.0 FO SUMMARY
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FO
	
MY	 T=0
	
T V c c	 OF POOR QUALCTYY
^
2)	 F03 3 2/04:47:00 MPD+NGP FO RAN
3)	 F013A/13A .1 7/17 2/07:30:00 PASS FO RAN
2/07:47:00
(4)	 F02 2 2/12:15:00 EBA FO RAN
(5)	 F05A/8/6 5/6/7 2/13:38:00 EBA/EBA/EBA DEP READY NO PROB
2/13:55:00
2/14:13:00
(6)	 F07/7 8/8 2/15:06:00 EBA+MPD FO RAN
2/15:24:00
7	 F08C 9 2/18:25:00 MPD FO RAN
8	 F04 4 3/03:13:00 EBA+NGP+MPD* E A STD
9	 F06/5B 7/6
3/06:40:00
EBA/EBA* RAN
(10)	 F09A/B 10/11 3/07:30:00 EBA+NGP/* RAN
3/07:50:00 EBA+MPD* MPD STD
FORA 9 3/09:00:0` MPD RAN
1
11
12	 F05A 5 3/23:26:00 EBA RAU 21 FAIL
13	 F014 6 CANCEL
(14)	 FO	 7/6 8/7 4/03:06:00 CANCEL
4/03:14:00
(15)	 F08B 9 4/04:26:00 CANCEL
(16)	 F06 7 4/06:10:00 CANCEL
(17)	 F05013A 5/17 4/10:27:0. RAU SERIAL TEST
4/10:34 :0G FAIL
(18)	 F09C 4/23:15:00 CANCEL
(19)	 F010/12 4/23:45.00 CANCEL
5/00:04:00 CANCEL
(20)	 F07 8 5/07:35:00 EBA+MPD FO RAN 3HVC'S ->
EBA STD - ALL STD
(21)	 F08 9 5/16:23:00 MPD SCHEDULING PROBLEM
FO RAN
(22)	 F09A 11 5/23:38:00 EBA+MPD* FO RAN
(23)	 F09B 11 6/02:48:00 EBA+MPD* FO RAN	 , RAU SKIPPED
(24)	 F09A 10 6/07:12:00 EBA+NGP* FO RAN
(25)	 F011 14 6/08:43:00 EBA+MPD* FO RAN
(26)	 F013A 17 6/09:19:00 PASSIVE FO RAN
6/09:36:00
(27)	 F06 7 6/10:11:00 NGP FO RAN,
	 BEAM NOT ON
(28)	 F013A 17 6/11:35:00 PASSIVE FO RAN, NO TRT MTV
(29)	 F01 1 7/15:35:00 HOT TEST CANCELED - RAU 21
CHECK PROBLEMS
(30)	 F013A 17 7/16:15:00 PASS CANCELED OCR
(31
	
13A
(32l	 F013A/13A
17 8/02:15:00 PASS CANCELED RAU 21
17 8/07:37:00 PASSIVE NOT RUN
8/09:54:00
(33)	 F013A 17 8/09:50:00 PASSIVE FO RAN
(34)	 F08A 9 8/10:22:00 EBA*MPD* F0 RAN
(35)	 F08A 9 8/10:52:00 EBA+MPD* T + 7 SECONDS
DEP READY NO
(36)	 F08A 9 8/11:22:00 EBA+MPD* FO RAN
(37)	 F08A 9 8/11:37:00 EBA+MPD* FO RAN
(38)	 F013A 17 8/13:50:00 PASSIVE FO RAN
(39)	 F013A 17 8/16:20:00 PASSIVE HUNG
1 (40)
	
FO	 1 1	 1 8/18:40:00 PASSIVE HUNG
-no Ean firings
FIGURE 2-1: TABULAR SUMMARY OF FO'S
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2R50
SO2A00
,S02A02
S02KOO
S02KOO
S02AOI
S02CO4
50.'C04
S02CO4
Sf12B03
502110:
SO2CO2
SO2F:00
SOM
SO2E06
SKE06
Sf12E01
SO2E01S012 K 01
S07E01
Sf12E00
Sf12E00
S02EO5
0079
0161
0930
0122
0122
0662
0179
0179
0179
0194
0",94
0143
1260
502803 S02E00 0328
037
S62FO3 S02EOI 0179
502003 S02COI 0179
S02DOS 5fl2E01 0181.
502110., S02EOI 0192
502000 S02E0 5 0143
1080
E
y
S02H02 Sfl2E0l 017V
SO-2A02 Sf12E.01 0179
SO^K04 Sfl !EO6 012?.
S02D04 Sfl2EO1 0181
SO"J..104 S(f2E01 0192
S02CO1 SfJ2E0 r 0145
S02F00 S02EO1 0104
5021:01 S02EO6 0122
S021%01 S02EO6 0122
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A►'
T=0 01ET) Two	 (011T) MODEL NAME. M f
0/18:43:00 333/10:43:00 BATT CHO ON
1/13:45:00 334/05:43:00 BATT CHO OFF
1/14:01:00 334/06:01:00 N2C/OF01 i
2/04:47:00 334/20!47$00 N2MF'C1F3* 3
2/04:59:00 334/20;59500 BATT CHO ON
p 2/11:12;00 333:/03512:00 BATT CHO OFF
do/07:'30:00 334/23 30:00 N2Fnl3A RLIN1 17
2/07:47:00 334/23:47:00 'N2FO13A RUN1 17
X2/12:15:00 335/04:,5500 N2Eb3F02 2
102/13:30:00 333/05:38,00 N2F,'SAH/6 5
2/13: 55: 00 335/03 5 5S 5 00 N2FW/6 7
2/14 ;13:00 ,335/06013:00 N2FSAH/6 A
1012/15:06:00 335/07:06:00 N2FO7/7 a
2/15;24:00 335/07:24500 N2FO7/7 R
2/18:25:00 335/10:25:00 N2FSC 9,.
h 2/18:34:00 3:5/10:34:00 BATT CHO ON
3/02:52500 335/18552:00 MATT CHO OFF
r^
t 3/03:13:00 335/19:13:00 N2EF12FO4 4
3/03:33:00 3irf/19*33:00 BATT CHO ON ,.{ 3/06:03500 335/22503:00 BATT CHIT OFF
a
13/06:23:00
3/06:40:00
335/22:23:00
335/22:40:00
N2FO6/5H'
N2F06/; k
7
6
3`/07:30:00 333/23:30:00 N2F9AA/M 30
3/07550:00 335/23:50:00 N2F9AN/M 11
)^/09:00:00 336/01500:00 N2FAA 9
3/12:00:00 336/04:00:00 BATT CHO ON
3/19510500 336/11:10:00 MATT CHO OFF
3/23:26:00 336/15-:26:00 N2SIJNFSA 5
3/23:34:00 336/1,5:341#100 N2SLINF5A SM0
3/23:56:00 336/15556:00 N2FO14 is
4/03506:00 336/19506:00 N2F09A/N 10
4/03:14:00 336/79:14:00 N2F09A/d 11
4/04:26:00 336/20:26:00 N2FRP 9
1''4/06:10:00 336/22:10:00 N2F 09C 32'
a
> 4/30:17500
•
337/02:1::00 N2FO13A 17
4/10:34:00 337/02534:00 N2FO1 3A 37
w
FIGURE 2-2:	 FCC
 CREW TIMELINE
„ —,40:00 337/04:30:00 b4TT CHO ON	 • >t •
4/22:45:00 337/14:45:00
R
BATT CNN OFF
R
^•
.•
r 4/23:15:00
1
337/1::15:00 143: UNF9C 37 S02s"^ 07 S02E01 01
4/23:23:00 337/15:33:00 N2SLINF9C SI10 6021702 S02EOI 01
4/43:45:00 + 337/15:45:00 N2F10/12 13 S02GO O S02EOO 01
5/00:04:00 337/16300:00 N2F10/12 35 S02GOO S02EOO 01
5/01:24:00 337/ 17:7.4:00 t N2 FO96 11 Srl?_1101 S02EOO 61' +
C) 5/02!58:00 :x:47/18: 58 :00 R N2FO: A S02 b00 502EO1 01;
5/03:18:00 337/19:18:00 BATT CHO ON 20:
5/15:59:00 338/08:59:00 ,BATT CHO OFF
05/16:23:00 338/08:23:00 NUOK R 12 S02F01 SO2E01 01E
54 16:32:00 •338/08:32:00 BATT CHO ON •	 • 1?3
6/00:48:00 338/16: dt`s 00 BATT CHO OFF '
'	 8/02:48:00 330/18:48:00• •N2FO9A 10 S02DOO S02E01 018
N/07:14:00 338/23:14:00' N2FO1j 14 502601 502EOO 019
6/08:43:00 339/00:43:00 N2F011.• 14 S02603 SO2E00 019
6/09:12:00 339/01:12:00 MATT CHO ON 132
i '	 6/18:00:00 339/30:00:00 BATT CHO OFFr
X6/09:19:00 339/01:19:00
R
N2FO13A
,
17 S02K02 S02E06 012
,
6/09:36:00 339:01:36:00 N2FO13A 1.7 S021(02 SO: E06 012
7/11:41300 340/03:41:00 BATT CHO ON 166 jl
••	 7/22:50:00 340/1:4:08:00 HATT CHO OFF
c 8/07:37:00. 340/23:37:00 N2FO1.3A• X7 ,' S021f03 S02 F. 012'
8/07:54:00 340/23:54:00 142FO13A 17 S02KO3 S02E06 017;
0/08•13.00 341/00:13.00 N2CFRF15 CONF• FOR RE?URN
9100:00 : 00 LAIIDII40
DUMMY TIMELINES 	 S02KO4rS02KOa,iS021(06 ► S021(07PS021C08
t
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FIGURE 2- 2: FO CREW TIMELINE
(CONTINUED)
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3.0 FO DETAILS
The following details are provided for each F0.
As part of the description, the statement "the FO timeline
was normal" is used to mean that the FO sequence (FO PREP, SMO,
FO, FO OFF) operated in the expected timeframe. This does not
imply that the SEPAC instruments worked properly.
Similarly, when the crew reported that an FO ran, that is
only an indication that the FO timeline sequence was proper.
Confirmation that the EBA, MPD, or NGP fired successfully
must be based on analysis of HRM data by the Japanese with
support	 from	 observations	 made	 by	 MTV.
(1) FO #E 1	 (SEPAC System Checkout)
On first attempt to run CFO there were two error messages:
"DEP 12 - ECAS CANNOT SEND MESSAGE TO DEP" and "DEP 17 -
ECAS UNABLE TO QUEUE MESSAGE FROM DEP".
Parker re Wed the DEP then reran FO 1 timeline.
A software gap of 10 - 15 seconds was noted on HRM around
FO OFF SEQ + 25 seconds.
(2) FO 13	 (MPD Test)
The FO #3 timeline was normal.
First NGP gas release may not have been Stood. 	 Dr. Kurici
thinks cold soak may have caused NGP valve to stick.
After warmup, NGP worked correctly. The g ame problem was
seen in Japan.
1
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(3)	 FO 13A/13A	 (Passive Experiment)
Owen enabled battery chargers for F0.
1st FO 13A
	
OFF SEQ Comp	 334/23:45:02
2nd FO 13A
	
OFF SEQ Comp
	
Not seen by crew
Crew waited about 7 minutes after OFF SEQ Comp message
should have been seen and turned IU/DEP off. This problem
has been seen on ground before.	 FO 13A was run with
PCF#69=1.	 Change of PCF#69=0 was not voiced to crew in
time for implementation.
Owen enabled MTV around T + 5 minutes ( 1st FO 13A) .
During 2nd FO 13A, Owen put MTV in manual to look at joint
beam firings. MTV was returned to auto prior to OFF SEQ
START.
Two gaps were noted during 2nd FO 13A.
4
f.	 (4)	 FO #2	 (EBA Low Power Test)
;-	 FO #2 timeline was normal.
Parker made PCF#69=0 entry then started FO PREP with
proceed approximately 7 minutes early.
A gap was noted during node #2.
In general, the crew and ground could not see a well
defined beam; however, one firing produced a faint pencil
beam while the other firings were diffuse.
(5)	 FO 5A/5B/6	 (Electron Beam Experiment 1 - Long Pulse)
(Electron Beam Experiment 1 - Short Pulse)
(Electron Beam Experiment 2 - NGP)
This multiple FO sequence was performed LOS. FO PREP for
FO 5A was scheduled and performed. Around T=O, the DEP
READY NO message occurred.
During FO PREP, Parker saw incorrect data (7), noticed
t	 ed chargers tchargers in INH, and urn	 	 o ENA.
The DEP READY NO condition ca'n arise when the IU and
NSSC-II lose communication. Firmware in the IU sends the
DEP READY NO when communication has been lost for 15
( 3	seconds.	 It has not been determined whether this
l z	condition did arise.
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On playback of this data, there was also
raising the possibility there may have
transient in the Spacelab system.
Japanese	 data	 shows	 FO	 began	 to
approximately 3 minutes into operation.
EBA firing pulse was not regular and
increased abnormally.
HRM data dropout
been a momentary
go	 abnormal	 at
At T=2 minutes,
the beam voltage
(6)	 FO 7/7	 (Electron Beam Experiment 3,-MPD)
Because of confusion
was started early to
acquisition was lost
good up to there.
Parker reported that
left MTV in manual; t
and uncertainty with prior F0, FO 7
allow ground to monitor HRM. Ground
prior to FO PREP START. Data looked
multiple FO 7 ran correctly. 	 Crew
herefore, there was no MTV for FO 7.
Japanese reported that EBA and heater worked normally.
(7) FO 8C
	
(Plasma Beam Propogation - Rotation)
FO 8C was run in LOS.
Crew reported FO 8C ran correctly.
(8) FO 4 (EBA High Power Test)
FO 4 had EBA shutdown just after T=O. Three HVC resets
were seen within one minute causing the DEP to perform the
EBA shutdown.
FCAS program continued to send HVC resets until manually
removed by ground request.
Owen reported seeing EBA (heater) glowing during FO PREP.
Japanese reported the following:
• When data available, there was heater overload
condition
• At T - 3.5 minutes, HVC reset pulse (delayed by ECAS
until T=0?)
F
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• At T + 12 seconds HVC reset pulse
• At T + 25 seconds HVC reset pulse
• At T + 1 minute EBA shutdown
• After EBA shutdown still detected, heater overload
until end of FO
(9) FO 6/5B	 (Electron Beam Experiment 2-NGP)
(Electron Beam Experiment 1 - Short Pulse)
Performed voice link to ,crew to set PCF#34 = 7.0 (heater
current) for this F0.
Owen thinks FO ran correctly; however, he did not see any
beam firing.
Japanese reported no heater current, no overload, and no
heater outputs.
(10)	 FO 9A/9B	 (Artificial	 Aurora - EBA/NGP)
(Artificial	 Aurora - EBA/MPD)
Performed	 voice	 link	 to	 crew	 to	 set	 PCF#32=0.6 (beam
voltage	 factor)	 and	 PCF#34=12.0	 (heater	 Current). Also
set	 for the FO was PCF#45=1	 via crew procedures.
FO PREP was	 started early by PROCEED.
Owen	 attempted	 to	 run	 SMO;	 however,	 since , he	 was not	 in
contingency mode SMO's did not work.
FO	 9A timeline	 was	 normal.	 w
Owen	 reported	 that he did	 not	 see any EBA firing. curing
FO	 9B	 an	 MPD	 shutdown	 command	 was	 sent	 by	 ECAS	 and
performed by DEP.
An ALL STD was issued by crew.
Japanese
	
reported:
•	 High voltage system ok
•	 Some Current detected in heater circuit
•	 Wave produced
i
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(il) FO SA	 (Plasma Beam Propogation //B)
FO 8A timeline was normal.
Owen reporter; seeing MPD firing at window and on MTV.
(12) FO 5A	 (Electron Beam Experiment 1 - Long Pulse)
FO 5A did not run because of RAU 21 failure. 	 IU/DEP was
turned on, but the DEP READY YES indicator never appeared.
(13) FO 14	 (Support 1 ES020)
FO 14 canceled because of RAU 21.
(14) FO 7/6	 (Electron Beam Experiment 3 - MPD)
(Electron Beam Experiment 2 -NGP)
FO 7/6 canceled because of RAU 21.
(15) FO 8B	 (Plasma Beam Experiment 2 1B)	
f.
FO 8B canceled because of RAU 21.
MTV was operated manually to observe ES020.
Owen saw no indication of ES020 firing.
(16) FO 6	 (Electron Beam Experiment 1 - Short Pulse)
FO 6 canceled because of RAU 21.
(17) FO 5A + FO 13A
	
	
(Electron Beam Experiment 1 - Long Pulse)
(Passive Experiment)
The following sequence was attempted twice:
• IU/DEP ON	 i
• CK SUM OK
16
• 10 Second countdown
• Received GMT & GNC
• No DEP READY YES message
HOSC reported IU sending INITIALIZE LINKS, some received
but others caused Manchester code errors on RAU - PAU 21
problem.
J'
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(18) FO 9C	 (Artificial Aurora - EBA)
FO 9C canceled because of EAU 21.
(19) FO 10/12	 (Equatorial Aeronomy)
(E//B - EBA/MPD)
FO 10/12 canceled because of RAU 21.
(20) FO 7	 (Electron Beam Experiment 3-MPD)
During FO PREP, the heater current was alternatevly set to
O.OA and 16.OA in an attempt to shock EBA heater.
At TO * 1:40, there was an EBA shutdown because of 3 HVC
resets in 1 minute.
Crew performed a HOLD then ALL STD.
In FO setup all 02A INH's were to have been set; however,
ground forgot to include HVC INN.
From this point on in the mission, the crew was instructed
to set HVC and EBA inhibits on page 02A.
No EBA firings were noted by the crew nor were they
confirmed on HRM data.. The EBA was not working.
(21) FO 8	 (Plasma Beam Propogation - //B)
Parker may have gotten FO 8 counting with incorrect (old)
time.
F
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According to SL printouts, Parker stopped first FO (don't
know how) then reran F0.
FO timeline ran normally. 	
a
(22) FO 9A	 (Artificial Aurora - EBA/NGP)
FO 9A timeline ran normally.
(23) FO 9B	 (Artificial Iwrora - EBA/MPD)
FO 9B timeline ran normally.
There were RAU skip error messages during F0. No adverse
affect noted.
(24) FO 9A	 (Artificial Aurora - EBA/NGP)
FO 9A timeline ran normally.
(25) FO 11	 (Electron Echo - EBA/MPD)
FO it timeline ran normally.
(26) FO 13A/13A	 (Passive Experiment)
Both FO 13A's timeline ran normally.
Crew	 thought	 that	 recorders	 were	 to	 be	 started
automatically (ground command) and they were not. 	 The
crew turned on recorders manually. 	 Only the last 5
minutes of data were recorded.
(27) FO 6	 (Electron Beam Experiment 2-NGP)
FO 6 timeline ran normally.
PCF #01 was not entered in time by crew.
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(28) FO 13A	 (Passive Experiment)
FO 13A timeline ran normally.
Because wrong HRM format (#11) was loaded, unable to get
HRM data.
The TV was turned on 8 minutes late by ground.
(29) FO 1
	 (SEPAC System Checkout)
FO 1 canceled because of RAU 21 problems.
i
(30) FO 13A
	 (Passive Experiment)
FO 13A canceled because of RAU 21 problem.
(31) FO 13A
	 (Passive Experiment)
FO 13A canceled because of RAU 21.
(32) FO 13A/13A	 (Passive Experiment)
FO 13A canceled because of RAU 21.
(33) FO 13A	 (Passive Experiment)
FO 13A timeline ran normally.
(34) FO SA	 (Plasma Beam Propogation - //B)
PCF #61=5 and PCF #71=0 were entered py crew.
FO PREP was started early by PROCEED.
Owen reported FO 8 ran normally.
a
a
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(35) F0 8A	 (Plasma Beam Propogation - //B)
FO 8A ran normally until TO + 7 seconds. then the DEP
counters quit. Eventually ( 1 minute). the DEP READY NO
status , occurreJ on DDU.
M	 (36) FO 8A	 (Plasma Beam Propagation - //B)
FO 8A timeline ran normally.
PCF #71=1 was entered by ,crew.
MPD firing was confirmed by Japanese EGSE. A gap occurred
around FO OFF SEQ + 1 Minute 50 Seconds.
(37) FO 8A	 (Plasma Beam Propogation - //B)
FO 8A timeline ran normally.
(38) FO 13A	 (Passive Experiment)
The objective of this operation was to run FO 13A for an
extended time. The method was to issue a HOLD at T + 14
minutes then issue a RESTART. This was to continue for 1
hour.
Crew performed HOLD/RESTART only once.
FO 13A's timeline ran normally.
(39) FO 13A	 (Passive Experiment)
The objective of this operation was the same as the
ii 	 previous FO 13A's. Instead. Parker scheduled two FO's.
l
A system stop occurred after T=O. DEP quit receiving 1HZ
interrupt but continued at approximately 1/7 speed. A RAU
21 communication problem was assumed to be the problem.
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(40) FO 1	 (SEPAC System Checkout)
A system stop occurred after T=0. A RAU 21 communication
problem	 was	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 problem.
21
4.0 MAJOR EVENTS
(1) MTV Stow
The first major event for SEPAC was the discovery that
the MTV was not in stow position when the pallet TV was
used to view the payloads. This was not a problem for
SEPAL. The Japanese seem to think that the MTV was left in
that position at level IV/III/II.
(2) EMSTL Change
Replanning Request 002-001 changed the Exception
Monitor Subordinate Timelines S02E01, S02EO2, and S02EO5 to
delete enab l e of SID's 3021, 3045, 3046, and 3048. This
was a permanent change to MMU.
(3) RAU 21
The first RAU 21 skip error messagi was reported at
MET - 0/9:16:30 or GMT - 333/01:10:12. The RAU 21 problem
was a major problem for SEPAC. When RAU 21"was in a fail
mode, SEPAC was ukable to perform any of its FU's as SEPAC
requires the serial channels for operation.
	 Based on the
data reviewed at the POCC, the RAU problems seemed to be
thermal	 related	 and	 manifested	 with	 the	 following
characteristics:	 I
(1) Discrete Outputs worked,
(2) Flexible Inputs (SI's or DI's) failed,
(3) Serial Output messages worked,
(4) Serial Input 1 word messages worked,
(5) Serial Input mulitple word messages failed.
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The serial channel failures were Manchester code
errors in the I/O coupler.
	
During the course of the
mission, several patches were implemented to get around or
heal the RAU 21 problems. These included:
(i) Patch to inhibit RAU 21 100HZ data sampling to
reduce 1/0 activity and, therefore, help keep RAU
cool.
(2) Patch to ignore I/O skip errors to keep ECOS from
NOP'ing the RAU.
•
	
	 There were several techniques used to keep the RAU
cool. When the coolant lines registered a temperature
greater than or equal 22 0 C the RAU quit. Below that
temperature, the RAU worked normally. (The RAU should
withstand temperatures up to 40' C.)
•	 Many, times throughout the mission, RAU 21 was NOP'ed
by the ground for several minutes then OP'ed.
	 When
NOP'ed, ECOS does not sample RA.. 21 I/0.
•
	
	 One of the two S p acelab DDU's was powered off when not
needed by the crew.
RAU 21 interfaces included EXP 001, EXP 002, EXP 0050
EXP 008, Horizon Sensor, and MSFC's EPDB.
At approximately 0/13:50, the 1/0 coupler was switched
to coupler B. There was no improvement on RAU 21.
r
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A procedure was developed with the ECOS/ECAS people
that would patch the DEP's MMU load file for the DEP to not
send serial output.	 The SEPAC ECAS would also be patched
to not send serial output nor expect serial input.	 This
procedure was never implemented because:
(1) Patching ECOS to allow the SEPAC DEP to perfrom
an MMU load was considered dangerous.
(2) The implementaticgn procedures were complex and
there was a low probability of success.
(3) The RAU 21 problem was intermittent and when
operational there was no need for these patches.
(4) ECOS Crash
	At approximately 0/11:20 there was an ECOS crash
	 A
believed to have been related to a memory patch. Only 2/3
of the memory dump EC was completed. SEPAC was not in
operation at the time of the crash.
(5) Playback
During the mission, the ground was unable to maintain
the Playback schedule. This caused SEPAC problems during
the time EBA trouble shooting was being performed. Since
the Playback data was late, the SEPAC team had tn perform
FO's without benefit of having data to review.
h
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(6) RAU 21-IU/DEP_Tests
Throughout the mission, the SEPAC IU/DEP was used as a
test point for RAU 21. By turning IU/DEP on, we were able
to determine the health of RAU 21 Serial and FI channels.
Sometimes there was a comedy of errors in tryin°g this
technique.
	
1/6:45
	 Crew turned IU/DEP on.
.Lost HRM data transmission to ground — POCC
problem.
	
1/8:03	 Crew turned IU/DEP on.
White Sands network fai 1 ur12 - no HRM data.
(White Sands down 40 minutes.)
4
1/11:15	 Crew turned IU/DEP on.
HRM received; DEP loaded, never received GMT
Serial from EC.
1/13:10	 Crew turned IU/DEP on.
POCC did not receive HRM.
6/6:12	 IU/DEP ON - RAU worked.
(7) Initial Activation
On first attempt to power up SEPAC IU/DEP, there was
no ground indication of IU/DEP on. Ground requested crew
to check panel feed. Crew had not turned rack on.
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(8) IU/DEP ON
On several occasions, the crew left IU/DEP on after
completion of f0 operations.
1/8:48	 IU/DEP left on for 50 minutes.
6/14:00	 IU/DEP left on for over 2 hours.
There may have been other occasions where IU/DEP left
on. Without real-time downlink, we could not determine all
such instances.
(9) GNAC Time
There was a. problem during day one when the GN&C data
contained a' GMT that was off by one day.
	 This was not a
problem to SEPAC. For experiments that used this GMT data,
there was concern. Experiments 13 and 20 were unable to
operate correctly until this problem was fixed.
(10) AEPI Locks I
AEPI (a SEPAC joint experiment) encountered a problem
putting its TV in the stow position after operations.
According to flight rules, three redundant methods for
stowing were required.	 One method would not work at al 1 ,
the second method had one failure in three attempts, and
the third method worked correctly. Because of this, AEPI
had to operate without bringing its TV out of locks.
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(11) HDRR Failure
The HDRR failed around 3/16:58 and was out until
4/03:04. The crew preformed surgery with ground
instructions.
(12) EBA Failure
A_major disappointment of this SEPAC mission was the
failure of the EBA. According to preliminary data, the EBA
worked for FO #2 and FO I/7. Then when FO 8C was run,
there was an EBA shutdown (3 HVC resets).
Loss of the EBA changed the whole nature of SEPAC
experiments for the mission.
(13) HPD Cylinder Expulsion
During the mission, there was an MPD cylinder
expulsion. This was clearly captured on MTV. The exact
time was recorded on MTV. According to the Japanese, this
was no problem and the MPD was used thereafter.
There should be some analysis on the potential problem
of the projectile from the MPD.
(14) Spacelab Power Surges
There was an activity during the mission to determine
what was perceived as power surges on the primary bus.
This resulted in the Spacelab DDU dropping offline.
4
'	 A
i
l
i
+1
27
SEPAC was requested to review the NRT data to
determine if there was a correlation between SEPAC events
(e.g.,	 MPD,	 EBA,	 or	 NGP	 firing)	 and	 the	 current
fluctuations shown on EPBD data.	 SEPAC did confirm that
there were some activities occurring around the times in
question; however, the frequency (15 minutes) raised
questions as to whether this was related to SEPAC or
something else.
The issue was later ,determined to not be SEPAC but
there was no detailed explanation as to what the problem
was.
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5.0 SOFTWARE LESSONS LEARNED
SEPAC software performed without any attributable problems.
` There were some gaps and four total stops. These have not been
analyzed to determine the conditions and causes.
There were several areas noted during the mission operation
where SEPAC software could be improved. These software areas
are described below.
(1) The active PCF values should be placed in Scratch Pad
Memory for ground observation. On several occasions, the
POCC team was not sure whether the crew implemented PCF
values. There is no easy way tc determine if all PCF
changes were made; and on several FO's, the crew did not
get all PCF's entered before the FO PREP start.
a
(2) The Intel PCM display station should be modified to have
the capability to display the static data in its buffers.
As currently designed, the system requires PCM sync to
activate the display functions.
(3) Additional status parameters should be included in HRM:
(a) Indicator for FO PREP start method (Proceed or Time)
(b) Status of control panel switches
(c) Receipt of shutdown commands
(4) Provide a capability (via PCF) for an FO to automatically
recycle to T=0 when FO operation is complete. The FO would
continue this sequence until an "ALL STD'' is received.
This type operation would be meaningful when a long
diagnostic run is required. An alternate method would be
to have the software perform a "HOLD- RESTART" at a given
node for a PCF defined time.
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(5) Implement an auto start FO scheme. A potential scheme is:
IU/DEP ON
DO UNTIL TIME
IF FO SCHEDULE RECEIVED
THEN PERFORM FO
ELSE PERFORM DEFAULT FO
ENDIF
ENDDO
The auto start FO would allow SEPAC to perform an FO
whether the RAU is operational or not.
•	
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6.0 GENERAL LESSONS LEARNED
Contained in this section are lessons learned that do not
necessarily relate to software.
r^
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User Room 7 Accomodations
Probably the most discussed item was the accomodations
provided in User Room 7 for SEPAC and AEPI. Stated simply - the
room was extremely overcrowded. The SEPAC area could accomodate
6 - 7 people on a reasonable basis. During FO scheduled times,
as many as 21 people were in the SEPAC area with an average of
12 - 15. This caused several things to happen:
1. There were insufficient jacks for everyone to monitor
the loops.
2. There was a continuous closelining or rabbit trapping
with headset cords as people moved around.
3. The temperature in the room was very warm because of
the .number of people and the amount of GSE.
These conditions caused a general confusion among team
members. It was hard to communicate, leading to
misunderstanding on what was happening and to the relaying of
incorrect information to the POCC. Generally, these situations
were corrected, but there was some agitation from the POCC with
SEPAC.
j	 31
Handover's
a
Initially the handover from one shift to another was
treated as a major production. As the mission progressed and
team members became tired, the handovers were much less formal
and were done on a team position basis (i.e., each offgoing team
member communicated with his oncoming counterpart). 	 There
should have been only one log book with each team member
submitting a copy of his log at handover. 	 Keeping log
activities by each team func-Lion is ok as long as they are
t	 eventually merged into one log book.
I	 strongly	 recommend
	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Flight
Events/History/Briefing 	 (Form
	
#JSC	 1441)	 for	 all	 future
d: missions.
A suggestion made during one of the handovers was to have
the handover meetings tape recorded and then transmitted. That
is a good idea.
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POCC Paperwork
The POCC paperwork went generally smooth.
	
One experiment
went overboard on OCR's inputting almost 700 OCR's. That type
flow caused a bottleneck and hurt other exprim.enters. Within
the SEPAC team, the biggest problem was the dissemination of
information on OCR's and RR's to the team members. Part of this
was definitely attributable to the language barriers with the
Japanese.	 Japanese held both positions of APOM and were,
therefore, responsible for writing OCR's and RR's. I believe
the system could be simplified by assigning that function on the
next mission to Americans.
For SEPAC, there were 55 OCR's and 10 RR's generated.
The use of a Personal Computer (PC) should also be
seriously considered. The PC would perform the following
functions:
•	 OCR b RR Status
•	 SEPAC Timeline
•	 GMT/MET/Local Time Coorelation
r	 Beam deflection calculations
For the investment ($1800), the payoff would be the
simplification of the POCC operations for SEPAC.
During POCC simulation, the sim team should hold a skull
session and go over the OCR and RR forms. Each item should be
discussed so the experimenter knows what those fields mean and
how they are used by POCC cadre.
Also during P000 simulation, the sim team should hold a
skull session on Timelines: how they are created, how they are
used, how they can be modified, and how they can be created.
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Playback
Throughout the mission, the playback schedule was
consistently behind. To catch up, the Data Coordinator would
have to skip playbacks. This required the experimenters to
submit a PDRF requesting the playback data. SEPAC did not have
tremendous success in obtaining playback data. Reasons include
the lack of a person designated for the prime responsibility of
obtaining playback and the general confusion in trying to get
the SEPAC POCC team coordinated for real-time of playback data.
Data Tapes
There was no plan for obtaining copies of the HRM data
recorded on SODA for analysis by NASA, SWRI, or Intermetrics.
An-impromptu plan was devised to have the SODA tapes copied at
the Intermetrics Houston facility. SWRI was to take these tapes
to their facilities to make copies for distribution to MSFC and
SWRI.
Since SODA was Japanese, a log of playback/real -time data
did not exist. This was requested from the Japanese but was not
made available.
Whether the data is ever analyzed or not, it would be
prudent for NASA/MSFC to have a copy of all data files resident
on SODA.
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NRT
The NRT system as currently, implemented is both slow and
limited. The NRT procedures are not crystal clear and it was
several days before the SEPAC team got the hang of running NRT.
NRT was not of any benefit to SEPAL.
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7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations for SEPAC refl i ght are divided into short
term recommendations and those of long term nature.
Short Term Recommendations
1. Investigate the system gap., system stop, and DEP READY NO
problems.
2. Analyze each of the software items in section 5.0 for
feasibility and costs; develop a plan for what software
changes should be made.
3. Acquire and database the SEPAC HAM SODA tapes. 	 r:
4. Analyze the HAM data to help determine the conditions
	 r
assocaited with EBA failure.
5. Investigate the possibility of moving the Burst Mode Logic
display calculations from the DEP to the IU.	 This would
remove the need for the DMA channel for the NSSC-II. As
currently designed, the IU sends BML data to the NSSC-II
via the DMA channel. The DEP then computers the BML display
parameters which are sent to the EC in a DEP user's
message.
6. Prepare a shopping list of changes that could be
implemented for SEPAL reflight.both on short term and long
term.
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Long Term Recommendations
I.	 Develop a Personal Computer workstation that could be
general purpose for all experimenters. 	 The potential for
using the PC for log records should also be considered.
2. Analyze the possibility of having control panel switch
settings downlinked.
3. Analyze the possibility of,having a manual EBA fire mode.
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